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Abstract - Virtualization is the underpinning technology enabling cloud computing service provisioning, and container- 
based virtualization provides an efﬁcient sharing of the underlying host kernel libraries amongst multiple guests. While there has 
been research on protecting the host against compromise by malicious guests, research on protecting the guests against a 
compromised host is limited. In this paper, we present an access control solution which prevents the host from gaining access 
into the guest containers and their data. Using system call interception together with the built-in AppArmor mandatory access 
control (MAC) approach the solution protects guest containers from a malicious host attempting to compromise the integrity of 
data stored therein. Evaluation of results have shown that it can effectively prevent hostile access from host to guest containers 
while ensuring minimal performance overhead. 
Keywords - Virtualization Security, Cloud Security, Container Virtualization, Access Control, System Call Interception 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The elasticity of resource allocation in cloud computing is mainly attributed to virtualization. The most prevalent 
form of virtualization is through a hypervisor or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). Hypervisors are assumed to be 
trustworthy in maintaining isolation using built-in operating system (OS) security tools. However provisioning of 
isolation among them tends to incur signiﬁcant performance overhead, due to its large trusted computing base 
(TCB). 
Container-based systems however only implement partial isolation supporting a shared namespace augmented 
with an access control mechanism that limits the ability of one guest virtual machine (VM) to manipulate the object 
owned by another VM [1]. While this allows for a light-weight alternative, the isolation amongst guests tends to be 
weak. 
We have recently discovered two vulnerabilities in which system calls that are not namespace aware can be 
exploited: (1) the ability to gain access to the guest containers’ internal ﬁle-system through a running container 
process, and (2) the ability to identify the processes running within the guest container. 
In this paper we propose a novel container virtualization security approach which addresses these vulnerabilities. 
Using system call interception with built-in AppArmor mandatory access control (MAC), it ensures the isolation 
between a compromised host and guest containers. 
In summary, the contribution of this paper is threefold: 
• We present two vulnerabilities to demonstrate a ﬂawed namespace isolation in the latest Linux kernel for 
container virtualization. 
• We design and implement a security solution which tackles the namespace-unaware system calls 
vulnerabilities using system call interception. 
• We extensively evaluate our scheme and show that it can efﬁciently address these vulnerabilities with 
minimal system overhead. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the two main virtualization 
technologies, namely hypervisor-based virtualization and container-based virtualization. Section III provides a 
detailed discussion on the two recently-discovered security vulnerabilities in container-based virtualization 
solutions, before discussing the security approaches in existing research in Section IV. The design rationale and 
implementation details are discussed in depth in Section V, with its performance discussed in Section VI. Section 
VII compares our approach with other virtualization security solutions in existing research, before arriving at the 
conclusion in Section VIII. 
 
II. VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGIES  
Virtualization facilitates the sharing of a server’s physical resources through resource emulation and can be 
broadly categorized into hypervisor-based virtualization, and container-based virtualization. 
Hypervisor-based virtualization enables the sharing of a server’s physical resources through device emulation. 
Each guest VM runs its own operating system, with the hypervisor regulating their access to the underlying physical 
resources. While this provides isolation between the guest VMs and the host, it tends to incur signiﬁcant 
performance overhead as the number of guests increases. 
Container-based virtualization overcomes this through virtualizing the host operating system kernel and libraries. 
This enables multiple guest containers to run on top of the host operating system without having to install guest 
operating systems themselves [2]. Isolation between the guest containers and the host operating system is achieve 
through the use of kernel namespaces and control groups (cgroups). 
Different components in a Linux operating system are organized into six global namespaces: ﬁle-system, 
network, user, IPC (inter-process communication), hostname and process namespaces [3]. Using the chroot 
command, kernel namespace enables the host operating system’s global namespaces to be shared across multiple 
guest containers [4]. 
While kernel namespaces allow a container to have its own root directory and processes, control groups 
(cgroups) facilitate the ﬁne-grained allocation of physical resources to a container [4]. 
Compared to hypervisor-based virtualization, container-based virtualization provides reduced performance 
overhead [5] and eliminates the need to install an additional kernel for the guests. 
 
III. NAMESPACE VULNERABILITIES 
In current Linux kernels, the namespaces and control groups (cgroups) provide resource isolation between host 
and guest containers. However, the host can be subjected to a “root break out” attack. This allows a root user 
running in the guest container to break out and become the root user of the host itself [6] [7]. 
While application sandboxing techniques such as SEC-COMP (Secure Computing mode) have been built into 
container-based virtualization solutions such as Linux Containers (LXC), they are limited in preventing the host 
from identifying the processes running within the guest containers and getting access to their root directories via the 
proc directory. 
We have recently discovered two security vulnerabilities, namely host break-in and illegal container process 
manipulation, which violate the isolation principle between the host and the guest container. While the former 
allows a root on the host to access a guest container’s ﬁle-system through an opened container process, the latter 
allows the host to identify any running container processes and manipulate their states. 
A. Host break-in 
Given a guest container Container1 running on the host LXCHost, a user space program nano with pid 
1517 is executed on it. In the container’s home directory, there is a text ﬁle called helloworld.txt containing the text 
as shown in the following command line snippet. 
ubuntu@Container1:˜ $ nano & [1] 1517 
ubuntu@Container1:˜ $ cat helloworld.txt Hello world from root!! 
ubuntu@Container1:˜ $ 
Next we launch the host break-in attack by running the ps command to list the current running processes, and 
ﬁltering out the guest container processes by their AppArmor security context (which is lxc_container_ 
 default). This allows the user to identify the process’s PID and use it to locate its entry in the proc directory. In 
this example, the helloworld.txt ﬁle in the guest container has a PID of 5612 and can then be accessed from the host 
via /proc/5612/ root/home/ubuntu/helloworld.txt. The following command line snippet 
demonstrates that the host break-in attack has been successfully launched and the text ﬁle helloworld.txt within the 
guest has been accessed. 
 
thu@LXCHost:˜ $ ps -eZ | grep \ 
> lxc_container_default | grep nano lxc-container-default 5612 ...nano 
thu@LXCHost:˜ $ cd /proc/5612/root 
thu@LXCHost:/proc/5612/root$ sudo cat /home 
/ubuntu/helloworld.txt Hello world from root!! 
thu@LXCHost:/proc/5612/root$ 
B. Illegal Container Process Manipulation 
This second vulnerability presents a more signiﬁcant threat to the guest container, as the host user does not need 
to be root in order to trigger the vulnerability. Using the same scenario, a user space program nano is executed in 
the guest container’s user space as shown in the following verbatim: 
ubuntu@Container1:˜ $ nano & [1] 1517 
Through the same technique as mentioned in the previous subsection, the user on the host can identify the nano 
process running within the guest container. Any regular (even non-root) users can the use the obtained PID to 
terminate it by executing the kill command from the host terminal as shown in the following verbatim: 
thu@LXCHost:˜ $ ps -eZ | \ 
> grep lxc-container-default lxc-container-default 
5221 pts/2 00:00:00 nano 
thu@LXCHost:˜ $ kill -9 5221 thu@LXCHost:˜ $ 
This results in the termination of the nano process which was previously running in the guest container as shown 
below: 
ubuntu@Container1:˜ $ [1]+ Killed nano ubuntu@Container1:˜ $ 
C. Potential implications of these vulnerabilities 
The presence of the above security vulnerabilities presents signiﬁcant impediments to the widespread adoption of 
container-based virtualization as an alternative to hypervisor-based virtualization. 
Using the host break-in vulnerability, the host can access the guest container ﬁles and manipulate them without 
the guest’s knowledge. In addition, the host can use this to install a malicious shell script into the guest container 
and manipulate its rc.local ﬁle executed on startup. This presents a threat to the integrity and privacy of the 
data stored within the guest containers. 
Similarly the presence of the illegal container process manipulation vulnerability violates the host-guest 
isolation, as the host is able to alter a guest container’s process state through commands such as kill. 
IV. ACCESS CONTROL AND SYSTEM CALL TABLE  
The proposed approach features the use of three main built-in OS mechanisms, namely Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC), AppArmor, and the system call table. 
A. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
Using the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) access control model [8] a MAC-based access control solution typically consists 
of three components, namely reference monitor, enforcement hooks and access control policies. 
1) Reference monitor: The reference monitor is a security module which is responsible monitoring all resource 
access requests [9]. It uses the access enforcement hooks to intercept any resource access request and grants access 
based on a set of pre-deﬁned access policies [10]. 
2) Access enforcement hooks: Placed at critical points within the kernel, access enforcement hooks are invoked 
when a user or a process makes a resource access request. They intercept any resource access requests and pass 
them to the reference monitor. 
 3) Access control policies (ACM): Deﬁned by the security administrator, access control policies are a set of rules 
which determine the resources which a user is allowed access to. 
B.AppArmor 
AppArmor is a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) solution designed to provide ﬁned-grained resource access 
control. 
AppArmor follows a ﬁle path-based approach (as opposed to the label-based approach as used in SELinux) in 
deﬁning access control policies for processes. An AppArmor proﬁle contains the directory paths which a given 
process can access as well as the operations (i.e., read, write, execute, etc) that can be done within them. 
C. System call table 
Exported during the kernel compilation process, it is a kernel data structure which contains pointers to the 
various system call functions which are scattered across different locations in the kernel space. 
When a process requires the execution of a system call from the kernel, it places the system call number in the 
EAX register (RAX register) and places the required system call parameters onto the subsequent registers (i.e., 
EBX, ECX, etc). It then triggers the SYSENTER instruction against the host CPU, resulting its moving into the 
more privileged Ring-0 and triggering the trap handler. The handler places the system call arguments on to the 
kernel stack, before looking up the system call table using the value in the EAX register to determine the system 
call to be triggered. The system call function is then triggered by passing the values in the kernel stack to the 
function. 
D. Limitations of existing access control techniques 
While the existing techniques are effective in controlling guest resource access in a virtualization environment, 
they are limited in a number of ways. 
One of the limitations is that the existing access control measures are designed with the assumption that the 
guest VM is the source of attack. However, they are limited in detecting malicious access from the host. Given that 
containers run on the host user space, an attacker can compromise the host through a software vulnerability and in 
turn manipulate the container state. 
In addition, the existing solutions typically leverage the access control mechanisms which are built into the 
hypervisor. Virtualization platforms such as KVM and Xen use sVirt and XSM (Xen Security Modules) 
respectively to enable the system administrator to deﬁne access control policies using SELinux (Security-enhanced 
Linux) providing a bidirectional access control between the host and the guest VM. While containers use 
sandboxing tools such SECCOMP (Secure Computing mode) to control the system calls which guest containers can 
issue, it does not provide the same functionality. This allows a malicious host to gain illegal guest resource access 
using the aforementioned vulnerabilities. 
V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. System Architecture 
Since the ultimate goal of container virtualization is to provide highly efﬁcient virtualization with low overhead, 
we have considered the following design guidelines in the design of our proposed approach: 
• r1 - Efﬁciency: The system should not incur too much overhead to impact the efﬁciency of the system and 
container. 
• r2 - Transparency: Both host and container should not be aware of the existence of the system. 
• r3 - Scalability: The system should be able to scale when the number of container increases. 
• r4 - Deployability: The system should be readily deployable in a production environment with minimal effort. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1: PROTECT Architecture 
 
The implementation of our proposed approach as a kernel module on the host provides a single point of control to 
monitor host attempts to access guest containers while ensuring minimal performance overhead, satisfying r1 
(efﬁciency) as well as r3 (scalability). 
Moreover, having a kernel-based container access control ensures a solution that does not require changes to the 
Linux Containers (LXC) source code, hence being completely transparent to the containers (r2). 
Our idea is similar to but distinctively different from the hypercall interception approach used in hypervisor- 
based virtualization security solutions [11][12]. One of the drawbacks of hypercall interception is that it requires the 
hypervisor source code to be recompiled for every hypercall modiﬁcation which is infeasible in a multi-host 
virtualization environment. By implementing our proposed approach as a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM), we can 
easily deploy it without code modiﬁcation (r4). 
B.Implementation 
Our proposed approach is composed of four components which are namely the system call interceptor, ﬁle path 
veriﬁcation, target process veriﬁcation, and AppArmor security context veriﬁcation as shown in Figure 1. 
1) System call interceptor: The system call interceptor is responsible for monitoring any attempts by the host to 
open ﬁles as well as to terminate a running process are monitored, by intercepting the sys_open and sys_kill 
system calls respectively. 
In order to intercept the sys_open and sys_kill system calls, the system call table sys_call_table 
entries containing the addresses of their respective functions are ﬁrst located. Their original addresses in the 
structure are then replaced with the system call functions of our proposed approach. 
2) File path veriﬁcation: To determine if an opened ﬁle belongs to a guest container, the sys_open system 
call is intercepted and the opened ﬁlepath is extracted from it. For example, when a user opens a ﬁle proc/ 
111/root/home/ubuntu/helloworld.txt, the underlying libc library triggers the sys_open system 
call by passing the function arguments as follows: sys_open("proc/111/root/ home/ubuntu/ 
helloworld.txt", O_RDONLY). The ﬁrst two sections (i.e., proc and 111) are extracted from the 
function argument, before being concatenated to read the process’s current ﬁle containing the AppArmor 
security context of the process. The host is denied access to the target ﬁle if it belongs to a guest container process. 
3) Target PID veriﬁcation: To prevent the host from altering the state of running guest container processes, our 
proposed approach monitors the host’s attempts to trigger the sys_kill system call for process termination. For 
instance when the user issues the command kill-9 111, the command arguments are passed to the sys_kill 
as such: sys_kill (111,-9). Once triggered, the target process ID (i.e., 111) is extracted and is used to 
determine its AppArmor security context by reading the current ﬁle as previously indicated. 
4) AppArmor security context veriﬁcation: Operating on the principle of least privilege, AppArmor restricts 
pro- cesses’ access to the host ﬁles and directories using security proﬁles. The deﬁned security proﬁles contain 
“path entries” [13] specifying the directories which the processes are allowed access to, along with their access 
rights to them. For instance a process such as ls is allowed access to the host system directories having been 
assigned the unconfined security context, but a guest container is restricted from doing so by being assigned 
 the lxc_container_default security context. Based on this observation, our proposed approach denies 
denying host access to guest container’s resources if the AppArmor security context input from the previous two 
components is lxc_container_default. 
5) Access control: If any malicious events are detected using the aforementioned approach, our proposed 
approach denies access to the guest container ﬁle as well as its ability to alter its running process state by issuing 
the EPERM error. 
VI.EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
A. Experiment Setup 
We have evaluated our implementation on a server with an Intel Xeon quadcore processor at 2.33 GHz along 
with 8GBs of memory, with Linux kernel version 3.18.18 (64- bit). The LXC (Linux Containers) platform was 
installed on the server node, with an Ubuntu guest container running on top of it. 
B. Evaluation Results 
1) Measuring sys_open execution time: To conduct this experiment, we ﬁrst created an Ubuntu guest 
container on the host, with nano running in it. We then created a small user space C program which uses  
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the sys_open system call to open the helloworld.txt ﬁle located on the guest. We executed the program 
100 times, each time opening the ﬁle 10 times both with the proposed approach running as well as without it. The 
time taken for both cases is shown in the boxplot in Figure 2. 
As expected, the amount of time taken to open the targeted container ﬁle is on average higher when our approach 
is running with the host kernel. The median execution time with the presence and absence of it are 45.4 
microseconds and 54.1 microseconds respectively, indicating an additional execution time of 8.7 microseconds on 
average. The increase in time is due to the context-switching performed by the proposed approach between the 
kernel and user spaces to access the container ﬁle’s AppArmor proﬁle. 
On the other hand, we can also observe that there are eight outliers in the proposed approach’s execution time. We 
believe that these sudden spikes in execution time are down to the effect of soft interrupts from other system 
operations and is more profound due to kernel-user space context- switching. However, given that we have only 
observed eight outliers out of a thousand points, we argue that these spikes will only happen rarely and will not 
bring a noticeable side effect to the system. 
2) Measuring sys_kill execution time: In order to measure the execution time taken by the sys_kill 
system call, we developed another small user space C program which kills a running process using the kill 
function given its process id (PID). During the experiment, we used the program to terminate the nano process 
running in an Ubuntu guest container. The program was run 100 times both in the presence of the proposed 
approach as well as in its absence, and the execution times for both are shown accordingly in the boxplots in 
Figure 3. 
At ﬁrst glance, we can notice that there is a signiﬁcant increase in execution time when the proposed approach is 
running within the host. More speciﬁcally, the median execution times are 8.4 microseconds and 27.8 microseconds 
with and without it respectively, representing an increase of 19.4 microseconds, or 230%. Similar to the case in 
 monitoring sys_open, the overhead increase is due to our proposed approach having to perform context switching 
between the user space and kernel space in order to determine the target PID’s security context before granting host 
access. Since the sys_kill’s routing is extremely simple and fast, the additional time for context switching 
becomes more profound. 
Despite this, we note that sys_kill is often only activated on user demand meaning that the performance 
overhead associated with monitoring it will not affect the overall system performance as it is too small to be 
noticeable by users. 
VII. RELATED WORK 
There are a few previous studies that have examined the performance of containers in various scenarios. [14] put 
VServer, OpenVZ, and LXC as well as Xen in a HPC (High Performance Computing) environment and found that 
that all container-based systems demonstrate a near-native performance of CPU, memory, disk and network. 
However, all types of containers tested have shown poorer isolation as compared with Xen. 
While [14][5][4] all reported reduced levels of isolation by containers as compared with hypervisors, and hence 
are more vulnerable to malicious events, little has been done to address this issue. Both [6] and [7] reported the 
incidents in which malicious containers can gain root privilege due to imperfect process isolation. The current 
industry solution has been to mainly leverage the existing techniques we presented in Section IV [15][16]. However 
such techniques only provide better isolation between containers and do not efﬁciently prevent a compromised host 
from performing malicious actions on the containers as we demonstrated in Section III. Our proposed approach 
addresses this type of vulnerability by intercepting and analysing malicious system calls in the kernel space. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While signiﬁcant effort has been expanded in isolating hosts and containers, i.e., preventing containers’ process 
gaining access to the host, limited work has been done preventing users who have access to a physical host gaining 
direct access into containers. In this paper, we presented two ﬂawed namespace vulnerabilities and demonstrated that 
they can be easily exploited to gain direct access to containers’ internal running processes. 
In order to fully protect containers from malicious host activities, we presented a new access control solution 
which features the use of system call interception while leveraging the existing AppArmor MAC solution. 
We have also extensively evaluated our approach under different scenarios. Our experimental results have 
revealed it was able to regulate illegal host access to guest containers while incurring negligible performance 
overhead. 
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